A Visual Guide to United States v. Windsor: Doctrinal Origins of Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion by Starger, Colin
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2013
A Visual Guide to United States v. Windsor:
Doctrinal Origins of Justice Kennedy’s Majority
Opinion
Colin Starger
University of Baltimore School of Law, cstarger@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Sexuality
and the Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
A Visual Guide to United States v. Windsor: Doctrinal Origins of Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy
130 (2013)
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  C O L L O Q U Y  
A VISUAL GUIDE TO UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR: 
DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S MAJORITY OPINION 
 Colin Starger* 
 
MAP EXPLANATION 
 
After finding that the Court had jurisdiction, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), reached the merits 
and concluded that the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the majority’s 
doctrinal reasoning on the merits as “nonspecific 
hand-waving” that invalidated DOMA “maybe on 
equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-
process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous 
federalism component playing a role.” Id. at 2707 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
This Map responds to Justice Scalia’s accusation by 
illustrating the doctrinal origins of Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion. Specifically, the Map shows how 
both the equal protection and substantive due process 
doctrines have contributed to a constitutional 
jurisprudence that affirms the rights of same-sex 
couples. The accompanying case descriptions 
highlight reasoning and quotes that ultimately 
influenced the majority opinion in Windsor. 
 
Moreover, the Map takes the sting from Justice 
Scalia’s complaint that the majority failed to conduct 
a proper substantive due process analysis. Justice 
Scalia argued that the opinion failed to ask whether 
same-sex marriage was a right “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition,” id. at 2707 (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)), and failed to articulate a “tier[] of scrutiny” 
when considering whether DOMA violated equal 
protection, id. at 2706. As demonstrated in the Map, 
however, the Court has long applied tests other than 
Justice Scalia’s when conducting both substantive 
due process and equal protection review. Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy’s doctrinal approach is consistent 
with precedent and the doctrinal traditions advanced 
by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Blackmun. 
 
Note: This Map is not the territory. It does not 
purport to represent every case backing the majority’s 
approach in due process or equal protection doctrine. 
Rather, it highlights representative and influential 
opinions that define the basic genealogy of Justice 
Kennedy’s doctrinal argument. Similarly, the Map 
does not draw every citation connection between 
opinions; arrows instead represent the key doctrinal 
lines in the same-sex marriage debate. Finally, note 
that opinion triangles grow in size based on the 
number of citations to the opinion represented on the 
Map. 
 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
Although the phrase “substantive due process” did 
not appear in Pierce, the case stands as a prominent 
example of that nascent doctrine. Justice 
McReynolds’s majority opinion struck down an 
Oregon statute that required public education for all 
children, finding the law “unreasonably interfere[d] 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of [their] children.” Id. at 
534–35. Justice McReynolds noted that the 
Constitution’s “fundamental theory of liberty . . . 
excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children.” Id. at 535. 
 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) 
Before Skinner, equal protection challenges to state 
legislation usually failed. Yet Justice Douglas’s 
majority opinion struck down Oklahoma’s Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act under the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Act punished those thrice convicted of 
larceny with sterilization but spared repeat 
embezzlers. Describing marriage and procreation as 
“basic civil rights,” Justice Douglas concluded 
“[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who 
have committed intrinsically the same quality of 
offense . . . it has made as invidious a discrimination 
as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for 
oppressive treatment.” Id. at 541. 
 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut 
law prohibiting the sale or use of contraceptives. 
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion held the law, as 
applied to married couples, violated the constitutional 
right to privacy. “We deal with a right of privacy 
older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political 
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is . . . 
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; 
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.” Id. at 
486. 
 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
In Loving, the unanimous Court struck down 
Virginia’s miscegenation law on both equal 
protection and due process grounds. In his opinion, 
Chief Justice Warren applied strict scrutiny and 
concluded that the law discriminated invidiously. He 
also cited Skinner for the proposition that marriage is 
a basic civil right and concluded that “deny[ing] this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis . . . 
[is] so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [that it] 
deprive[s] all the State's citizens of liberty without 
due process of law.” Id. at 12. 
 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a Massachusetts 
law that prohibited distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons. In his plurality opinion, Justice 
Brennan ostensibly applied rational basis scrutiny but 
nonetheless rejected all of the state’s asserted 
rationales for the law. Justice Brennan argued that 
“[i]f under Griswold the distribution of 
contraceptives to married persons cannot be 
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons 
would be equally impermissible,” as the relevant 
right to privacy inheres in the individual rather than 
in couples. Id. at 453. 
 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
Roe famously—and controversially—recognized a 
substantive due process abortion right. Justice 
Blackmun’s majority opinion claimed doctrinal 
justification for a constitutional right of privacy from 
the Griswold–Pierce line of cases as well as from 
other lines including that from Skinner to Eisenstadt. 
“This right of privacy,” wrote Justice Blackmun, “is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 
153. 
 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528 (1973) 
In Moreno, the Court struck down a portion of a 
federal law that denied food stamps to households 
composed of unrelated individuals. Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion noted that the legislative history 
showed that the provision was intended to deny 
“hippies” and “hippie communes” food stamps. Id. at 
534. Justice Brennan wrote, “[I]f the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.” Id. Justice Kennedy directly cited Moreno 
in Windsor and similarly questioned Congress’s 
purpose in passing DOMA. 
 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
The majority in Bowers, per Justice White, upheld 
the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy statute 
against a same-sex challenge. Like Justice Scalia in 
Windsor, Justice White insisted that only liberties 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
deserved constitutional recognition. Id. at 192 
(quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)). 
Justice Blackmun forcefully dissented. He construed 
the Court’s precedent differently and argued that the 
Constitution protected “the right of an individual to 
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his 
or her own home.” Id. at 208. 
 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
The first of four Justice Kennedy majority opinions 
in the Map, Casey (co-authored by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) found that stare 
decisis required upholding Roe’s recognition of a 
woman’s right to choose an abortion before fetal 
viability. Regarding the proper substantive due 
process inquiry, Casey quoted Justice Harlan: Due 
process “is the balance struck by this country, having 
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from 
which it developed as well as the traditions from 
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. . . . No 
formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for 
judgment and restraint.” Id. at 850 (quoting Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
In Romer, the Court struck down Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 that purported to deny LGBT persons 
special rights. Justice Kennedy, however, found the 
law much broader––“[i]t identifies persons by a 
single trait and then denies them protection across the 
board. . . . It is not within our constitutional tradition 
to enact laws of this sort.” Id. at 633. Arguing that the 
law’s peculiar nature defied conventional rational 
basis review, Justice Kennedy cited Moreno for its 
proposition that a bare desire to harm unpopular 
groups violates equal protection. In Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy returned to this proposition and relied 
heavily on Romer in striking down DOMA.  
 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
In Lawrence, the Court overruled Bowers and struck 
down Texas’s law against homosexual sodomy. In 
his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy explicitly 
embraced the substantive due process logic of Justice 
Blackmun’s Bowers dissent and of the Casey 
majority. Tellingly, Justice Kennedy also pointed to 
Romer as evidence that the jurisprudential 
foundations of Bowers had been eroded. Thus, Justice 
Kennedy in Lawrence used an equal protection case 
to justify finding a substantive due process right. In 
Windsor, Justice Kennedy once again bridged the two 
doctrines by citing Lawrence as reason to strike down 
DOMA on equal protection grounds. Though Justice 
Scalia’s Windsor and Lawrence dissents complained 
about Justice Kennedy’s doctrinal crossbreeding, the 
history revealed by this Map shows that equal 
protection and substantive due process often form 
two complimentary sides of the same constitutional 
coin. 
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